Wipro announced an eight year, US$1 billion engagement with Olam Group, along with the acquisition of Mindsprint, Olam’s internal technology and digital services arm, for US$375 million. 

On the surface, this is a large outsourcing deal combined with an acquisition. But the structure of the deal points to something more relevant for the Global Capability Center (GCC) market.  

GCC externalization continues to be a stated ambition for many enterprises, but scaled examples have been limited in recent years. In parallel, carve-outs and divestitures are becoming more visible. These are not linked to failure of externalization, but reflect how enterprises are reassessing these assets. 

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I. Wipro’s deal with Olam

Wipro signed an eight year, US$1 billion transformation deal with Olam, a global food and agri business with operations across more than 60 countries. The structure of the deal includes: 

• Around US$800 million in committed services spend  
• Roughly US$100 million in annual run rate  
• Coverage across technology and business operations  

Alongside this, Wipro is acquiring Mindsprint. If this were only a services contract, it would still be one of the larger deals in recent years. The acquisition adds a different dimension, linking delivery capability with ownership of the underlying GCC.

II. What Mindsprint represents 

Mindsprint originated as Olam Technology and Business Services, which functioned as Olam’s GCC for nearly three decades. Over time, it became deeply embedded in Olam’s operations, covering enterprise systems, supply chain platforms, data and analytics, cybersecurity, and business process services. . 

In 2023, it was rebranded as Mindsprint and repositioned as a more independent entity. It also saw leadership changes and some expansion beyond Olam, including presence in Chennai, Sydney, and New Jersey, with a workforce of over 3,000 employees. 

It also built a set of platforms aligned to Olam’s business model: 

• Farmsprint for plantation management  
• Tradesprint for commodity trading and risk  
• ProcureSPRINT for procurement transformation  
• SprintAP for accounts payable  
• SalesSprint for sales operations  

These platforms were developed within Olam’s operating context and later formalized as proprietary Intellectual Property (IP). For Wipro, the acquisition brings a combination of domain capability, delivery scale, and sector specific platforms. 

III. Understanding the deal economics 

Mindsprint reported revenues of about US$118.9 million in CY23, US$130.5 million in CY24, and US$135.6 million in CY25. Growth has been steady, but has slowed in the most recent year. At around 2.8x revenue, the acquisition multiple is higher than what is typically seen for mid sized IT services firms. However, this needs to be viewed in the context of the overall deal. 

The structure includes: 

• An eight year services contract of around US$800 million  
• Annual revenue of about US$100 million linked to Olam  
• Transfer of the delivery organization through the acquisition  

When looked at together, a large portion of revenue is already contracted, the acquired entity is the primary delivery engine for that work, and the remaining value depends on scaling beyond Olam. This is not a standalone acquisition. It is closer to acquiring a GCC along with a committed revenue stream.

IV. Revenue concentration and the limits of externalization

At the time of acquisition, a significant share of Mindsprint’s revenue came from Olam, estimated between 80 and 90 percent. Mindsprint had articulated a plan to reduce this over time, with a target of bringing Olam’s share closer to 50 percent over the next few years. There were early signs of progress, including some external clients and sector expansion, but this effort was still at an early stage. Given this level of concentration, Mindsprint was still operating largely as a GCC at the point of divestiture, even as it had begun exploring an external market presence. 

This pattern is not new. Some of the most well known externalization stories also began as captive units with high dependence on the parent. Genpact originated as the back office operations unit of GE Capital, WNS began as the business process arm of British Airways, and Cognizant started as the in-house technology unit of Dun and Bradstreet. While their starting points were not identical, each of these businesses had significant parent dependence in the early years and took time to build a diversified third party client base. The transition to an independent business required sustained investment in sales capability, market positioning, and service diversification. 

What is different today is the context in which GCCs are attempting this transition. Across more recent examples, progress has been slower and outcomes more limited. Third party revenue takes longer to build, dependence on the parent remains high for extended periods, and capabilities built for one enterprise are not always easily transferable to a broader market. 

Externalization is not unviable. The earlier examples show that it can work. However, it is difficult to execute, and scaled outcomes have been limited in recent years. Mindsprint fits into this broader pattern, having begun the transition but not yet reached meaningful diversification beyond the parent.

V. Carve-outs as a strategic option

Carve-outs are best understood as one of several strategic options available to enterprises when evaluating their GCCs. 

At an enterprise level, cost optimization is becoming more prominent, leadership teams are simplifying portfolios, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is changing how operating models are evaluated. At the same time, GCCs are not uniform. Some are highly strategic and continue to see investment, while others are operationally important but not core, or require additional investment to remain competitive. 

Given this, enterprises are evaluating multiple paths. These include continuing to operate the GCC internally, investing further, building a third party business, or divesting to a strategic buyer. 

Carve-outs offer a different set of outcomes: 

• Immediate value realization  
• Continuity through long term service agreements  
• Transfer of scaling responsibility  

This is why they are becoming more visible. In certain situations, this route can be more aligned with enterprise priorities than building an independent business over time. 

VI. Why recent outcomes differ from earlier examples 

Examples such as Genpact, WNS, and Cognizant are often referenced when discussing externalization. These cases emerged in a different context where the outsourcing market was at an earlier stage, cost arbitrage was a stronger driver, competition was lower, and separation from the parent was simpler. 

Today, GCCs are more embedded in core operations, technology environments are tightly integrated, and capabilities are often specific to the parent’s business. This makes externalization more complex to execute, especially at scale. 

VII. The bigger signal for the market 

This deal is unlikely to be a one off. There are many GCCs that have been operating for 15 to 20 years and have built meaningful capability over time. At the same time, their parent organizations are facing a different set of pressures than when these centers were originally set up. 

In the case of Mindsprint, despite the repositioning and early external efforts, the business was still largely tied to Olam. With 80 to 90 percent of revenue coming from the parent, it was effectively still operating as a GCC at the point of divestiture. The transaction is therefore better understood as a carve-out of a captive unit rather than a scaled externalized business. 

There are also precedents for this structure. The Infosys Danske Bank deal involved the carve-out of Danske Bank’s captive unit as part of a broader transformation engagement. TCS has executed comparable transactions, including with Deutsche Bank (Postbank) and Prudential Financial (Pramerica), where internal technology units were transferred along with long term services agreements. Deloitte’s engagement with Canada Post also followed a similar construct, combining capability transition with managed services. 

Across these cases, the motivations differ, but the underlying structure is consistent. A captive capability is transferred to a service provider, and the relationship continues through a long-term contract. 

We expect more activity across: 

• Mature GCCs with established delivery capability  
• GCCs where ownership is being re-evaluated  
• Assets with niche IP but limited external scale  

Many of these transactions are likely to follow a similar structure, with a divestiture linked to a long term services agreement. 

VIII. Key takeaways 

For GCC leaders, externalization remains a valid path, but it requires sustained investment and time. The transition from internal delivery to a market facing business is not straightforward. 

For service providers, these deals provide access to contracted revenue, along with talent and domain capability. The long term value depends on the ability to scale beyond the parent. 

For enterprises, GCCs are increasingly being evaluated as portfolio assets, with divestiture being one of several strategic options. 

The central question is shifting from how to externalize to where the asset creates the most value. 

If you enjoyed this blog, check out, The Rise of Holistic Global Capability Center (GCC) Set-up Solutions: Partnerships, Playbooks, and Pitfalls – Everest Group Research Portal , which delves deeper into another topic relating to GCCs. 

If you’d like to discuss the topics discussed in this blog in more depth, please contact Shivam Singh ([email protected]) and Akshay Mathur ([email protected]).